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Canada’s Current Position with Respect to




With the exception of Canada, sound marks have become increasingly recog-
nized and registrable throughout the world.1 The use of sounds as a trade-mark is
particularly interesting and innovative as sounds disregard all language barriers.
With the globalization of market and trade and the rapid evolution of technologies,
an increase in applications for sound marks registration in future years seems pre-
dictable.2 Therefore, the analysis of the legal and practical aspects in this matter is
of great interest as it will further the understanding of the reasons for which Canada
is not a pioneer in this field.
Canada was amongst the first countries to enact trade-mark legislation. Prior
to Confederation, in 1860, the Legislative Council and Assembly of Canada
* © 2010 M.J. Provost, LL.B. Université de Montréal, LL.M. McGill University,
member of the Québec Bar. I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Professor Tina
Piper, for her time and her relevant advice and suggestions. A special thank you to
Marc Provost and to Marie-Christine Roch-Hansen for their precious comments.
1 For instance, the United States, European Union and Australia allow sound marks re-
gistration; David Vaver “Unconventional and Well-Known Trade Marks” (2005) Sing.
J.L.S. 1, at 2 [Vaver, “Unconventional”]; Canadian Intellectual Property Office, corre-
spondence dated May 15th, 2009: « L’Office de la propriété intellectuelle du
Canada est fier de répondre aux besoins de sa clientèle. En réponse à votre
demande, les marques sonores ne sont pas enregistrables au Canada ».
2 Marcus Höpperger, “Non-Traditional Marks — Singapore Treaty Enters into Force”
(2009) WIPO Magazine, online:
<http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/01/article_0002.html> (It is interesting
to note that efforts have been made in order to defined areas of convergence related to
the reproduction and description of non-traditional marks: The Singapore Treaty on the
Law of Trademarks “sets out a multilateral framework for the definition of criteria
concerning the reproduction of hologram, motion, color and position marks and of
marks consisting of non-visible signs on trademark applications and in trademark regis-
ters.” The Singapore Treaty entered into force on March 16, 2009. Moreover, the
WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geo-
graphical Indications (SCT) has defined “a number of areas of convergence concerning
the representation and description of non-traditional marks, such as 3D marks, ho-
logram marks, position marks, multimedia marks or sound marks. Those areas of con-
vergence reflect a common approach by all WIPO Members to the representation and
description of non-traditional marks and provide the first international reference in that
area).”
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adopted An Act respecting Trade-Marks.3 However, the most recent major revision
to Canadian trade-marks legislation was in 1953 with the passing of the Trade-
marks Act.4 Since then, the TMA has remained relatively unchanged as only a few
amendments have been made.5 Nevertheless, in 2005, the Canadian Intellectual
Property Office (CIPO) published proposals to modernize the TMA in order to
maintain an efficient trade-mark regime, to respond to new trends and to enhance
Canadian’s competitiveness in the market place. CIPO invited comments regarding
a number of trade-mark improvements, including issues surrounding the registra-
tion of non-traditional trade-marks, such as sound marks.6 While applications for
the registration of sound marks continue to be rejected in Canada, these proposals
indicate that CIPO might be considering extending statutory protection to some
forms of non-traditional trade-marks.
Historically, the conventional way of distinguishing products or services of
one person from those of another was through the use of traditional trade-marks,
which usually consisted of words or specific designs.7 For instance, Nike, Coca-
Cola and the McDonald’s Golden Arches logos are famous, legally established,
conventional trade-marks.8 However, the expansion of the Internet, the growing use
of new technologies, and the globalization of markets have led to the development
of a wide variety of new methods and strategies to distinguish products and ser-
vices.9 Companies now feel the need to distinguish themselves in new ways in or-
der to attract consumers and stay in the market.
As a result, conventional trade-marks, which are essentially limited to the use
of words and designs, are joined by innovative, non-traditional trade-marks.10
3 Kelly Gill & R. Scott Jolliffe, Fox on Canadian Law of Trade-marks and Unfair Com-
petition, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 1–3.
4 Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 [TMA].
5 The most significant amendment occurred in 1993 with the abolition of the Registered
User regime in favour of section 50 (as it is known today).
6 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Proposals for Comment Relating to Moderniza-
tion of the Trade-marks Act (Industry Canada, 2005), online:
<http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00676.html>
(CIPO invited comments concerning the adherence of Canada to the Trademark Law
Treaty and the Madrid Protocol and on a number of trade-mark improvements).
7 Bob H. Sotiriadis & Laurent Carrière, “The Statutory Protection of Non-Traditional
Trade-Marks in Canada — A Few Reflections on Their Registrability and Distinctive-
ness” (2000) Leger Robic Richard, online:
<http://www.robic.ca/publications/Pdf/235E-BHS.pdf> (“We generally conceive a
trade-mark as constituted of one or many letters, one or many words — invented or
not — a sentence, armorial bearings, seal, hallmark, label, numbers, drawing, or even a
combination of these” at 2). See also Guillermo Bosch Canto, Analysis of Non-Tradi-
tional Trademarks in North American Countries (LL.M. Thesis, Graduate Department
of Law of the University of Toronto, 2007) [unpublished], at 24.
8 Vaver, “Unconventional,” supra note 1 at 1-2.
9 John S. Macera & Adele J. Finlayson, “Eccentric Trade-Marks, Smells and Bells
Grooves and Moves” (2003) at 1-2, online: Moffat & Co., Macera & Jarzyna LLP
<http://www.moffatco.com/pages/publications/SmellsBells.pdf>.
10 Ibid.
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These may include sound marks, scent marks, taste marks, shape marks, texture
marks, colour marks and motion marks.11 The use of these novel marks goes be-
yond conventional methods because it reaches consumers through their five
senses.12 These types of marks were thought to be essentially unregistrable as
trade-marks until recent years, where the possibility of registering non-traditional
marks, particularly sound marks, has been growing internationally.13 For instance,
in Australia, trade marks law has been amended to broaden the definition of a
trade-mark in order to include non-traditional trade-marks, such as sound marks. In
Canada, however, sound marks remain unregistrable as trade-marks.
This paper analyses and criticizes Canada’s position on sound marks registra-
tion in order to recommend the ways in which Canadian policy-makers could fur-
ther act in order to advance this area of law. The first part of this paper exposes the
fundamental concepts of trade-marks as they are necessary to the comprehension of
the problems surrounding the registration of sound marks. In the second part, legal
considerations associated with the registration of sound marks are discussed. More
specifically, the visual requirement, the issue of “use,” the concept of distinctive-
ness and the question of overlap with copyright are assessed. In the third part, prac-
tical concerns related to the representation of sound marks are addressed and rec-
ommendations are made.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
(a) What is a Trade-Mark?
Trade-marks are commonly classified as intellectual property, along with pat-
ents and copyright. The owner of a trade-mark, however, is not required to provide
the public with some novel benefit, as with patents or copyrights,14 in exchange for
a monopoly. The purpose of trade-mark law is to distinguish the wares or services
of one person or organization from those of others in the marketplace and, conse-
11 Vaver, “Unconventional,” supra note 1 at 2.
12 Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson Lalonde, “Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and
Cherry-Scented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks” (2005) 95
TMR 773 (“An emotional connection to a brand makes the brand more compelling and
engenders consumer loyalty, Lindstrom says” at 775); Martin Lindstrom, BRAND
sense: Build Powerful Brands Through Touch, Taste, Smell, Sight and Sound (New
York: Free Press, a division of Simon & Schuster, 2005) (“The research demonstrates
that taste, touch and smell are intimetly involved in creating a great brand experience
and continued loyalty. The role of sound to create an emotional response is well docu-
mented. Sight may convey information well, but even at best it creates a less deeply
felt emotional response” at 161).
13 Vaver, “Unconventional,” supra note 1 at 2; see also Appendix 1: Sound Marks Regis-
trability by Jurisdiction in 2006, below.
14 Mattel U.S.A. Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, ¶21 (S.C.C.) (Unlike
patent law, which grants a time-limited monopoly to the patentee in return of the dis-
closure of his invention, and copyright law, which grants right of exploitation to the
author of an original work and has the original purpose of encouraging culture and the
distribution of expressive work in the human repertoire).
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quently, guarantee the source of the goods.15 In addition, trade-marks represent the
reputation of the producer and help consumers identify and purchase a certain qual-
ity associated with this particular mark.16 The goodwill, as it is embodied in a
trade-mark, is therefore considered as valuable for the producer.17
The definition of a trade-mark provided by section 2 of the TMA reads as fol-
lows: 
“trade-mark” means
(a) a mark that is used by a person for the purpose of distinguish-
ing or so as to distinguish wares or services manufactured, sold,
leased, hired or performed by him from those manufactured,
sold, leased, hired or performed by others,
(b) a certification mark,
(c) a distinguishing guise, or
(d) a proposed trade-mark;
Subsection (a) of the above definition provides the fundamental components
of a trade-mark.18 First, a trade-mark must be “a mark” and second, it must be used
for the purpose of distinguishing or so to distinguish wares or services of one per-
son from those of another. In the sections that follow, these principal attributes and
the different categories of trade-marks will be discussed in turn. This brief over-
view of fundamental elements will subsequently be useful in assessing the registra-
bility of sound marks in Canada.
(i) Principal Attributes
(A) A Mark
The word “mark” is unfortunately not defined by the TMA. Some consider the
definition of the word to be presumably as broad as the term “symbol,” used in the
Unfair Competition Act.19 Others believe it could be co-extensive in meaning with
15 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1997) at 176 [Vaver,
Intellectual]; United Artists Pictures Inc. v. Pink Panther Beauty Corp., [1998] 3 F.C.
534, 225 N.R. 82, 80 C.P.R. (3d) 247, ¶15 (Fed. C.A.); leave to appeal allowed (1998),
1998 CarswellNat 3295 (S.C.C.) [Pink Panther]; Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942) (the law’s recognition of
the psychological function of symbols); Perry v. Truefitt (1842), 6 Beav. 66, 49 E.R.
749 (Eng. Rolls Ct.) (a man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are
the goods of another man).
16 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, A Guide to Trade-Marks (Industry Canada,
2005) at 2 [CIPO, Guide to Trade-Marks]; World Intellectual Property Organisation,
“What is a Trademark?” online: WIPO Resources
<http://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/trademarks.html>.
17 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., 2005 SCC 65, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, ¶39 (S.C.C.).
18 Gill & Jolliffe, supra note 3 at 3–6.
19 Unfair Competition Act, S.C. 1932, c. 38, at para. 2(m); Gill & Jolliffe, supra note 3 at
3–12; Harold G. Fox, The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 3d
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1972) at 20; Sotiriadis & Carrière, supra note 7 at 25.
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the old definition appearing in the Trade Mark and Design Act20 or with the one in
the North American Free Trade Agreement.21 On the basis of the ordinary meaning
of the word “mark,” however, the Federal Court of Canada decided in the 1987
Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Germain22 decision that a “mark” must be something
that can be represented visually.23 This position constitutes one of the main obsta-
cles for the registration of sound marks in Canada and will be discussed in detail in
the second part of this paper.
(B) The Concept of Distinctiveness
“Distinctive,” in relation to trade-marks, means: “a trade-mark that actually
distinguishes the wares or services in association with which it is used by its owner
from the wares or services of others or is adapted so to distinguish them.”24 Dis-
tinctiveness is the essence of a trade-mark because only a distinctive trade-mark
will assure consumers of the origin and identity of the source of the goods from all
others.25 However, a mark does not need to be nationally distinctive in order to be
registered, for example, it is possible for a mark to only be distinctive in Montreal
and still be registered for all of Canada.26
A mark can be distinctive in one of two major ways. First, a mark can be
inherently distinctive. For example, invented words like Kodak, Rolex and
Lululemon fit into this category. These fanciful words are “adapted to distinguish”
because they have the capacity without use to be accepted as trade-marks.27 On the
other hand, a generic sign may lack distinctiveness. For example, the term “drink”
for alcoholic beverage would not normally be inherently distinctive because it is
commonly used to describe the good itself.28 Second, a mark can acquire distinc-
tiveness, commonly called “secondary meaning.”29 Acquiring secondary meaning
implies that a word’s initial meaning evolves over time to include a second mean-
ing, which becomes an indicator of source for products or services.30 For instance,
20 Trade Mark and Design Act, 31 Vict., c.55, at s. 5 — “all marks, names, labels, brands,
packages or other business devices”; Gill & Jolliffe, supra note 3 at 3–12.
21 North American Free Trade Agreement, 12 December 1992 (Ottawa: Supply & Ser-
vices, 1993), art. 1708(1) (“any sign, or any combination of signs [. . .] including per-
sonal names, designs, letters, numerals, colors, figurative elements”); Vaver, Intellec-
tual, supra note 15 at 188.
22 Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Germain (1987), 16 C.P.R. (3d) 517 (Fed. T.D.) [Playboy]
23 Ibid., at 522.
24 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 2.
25 Kirkbi, supra note 17, at para. 39; Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 189-190.
26 TMA, supra note 4 at ss. 18(1)(b), 38(2)(d); Vaver, Ibid. at 190.
27 Vaver, Ibid. at 189.
28 WIPO, Standing Committee on the law of trademarks, industrial designs and geograph-
ical indications, Trademarks and Their Relation with Literary and Artistic Works,
WIPO doc. SCT/16/5 (2006), 16th Sess., at 6. [SCT/16/5]
29 Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 189.
30 Ibid. at 189; Daniel Gervais et Elizabeth F. Judge, Le droit de la propriété intellectuelle
(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2006) at 220-221.
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words that are clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive and nominal marks
are not registrable31 unless proof of distinctiveness is provided.32 Marks like Allb-
ran or Shredded Wheat may be examples of marks that can be seen as merely de-
scriptive because they designate certain characteristics of the wares in question and,
thus, are not initially “adapted” to distinguish products of one producer from
others. However, through use and advertising, over time, these primarily clearly
descriptive marks can acquire distinctiveness and then be registrable. Distinguish-
ing guises,33 for example, must become distinctive through use in order to be
registrable.34
(C) The Concept of “Use”
Use is a fundamental concept in trade-mark law. It is through use that trade-
mark rights are acquired,35 maintained and violated.36 Without use, or proposed
use, a trade-mark cannot be registered and, if it is registered, it can be expunged for
non-use.37 The definition of “use” differs whether the trade-mark is used in relation
to wares or whether it is used in relation to services.38 Though, in both situations,
when determining if a trade-mark is used within the meaning of section 4 of the
TMA, it is necessary to read this section together with the definition of a trade-mark
in section 2 of the TMA.39 Thus, a mere use is not enough. The use of a trade-mark
needs to be made for the purpose of distinguishing products or services of one pro-
ducer from others.40 Therefore, the “use” within the meaning of the TMA does not
always coincide with “use” in ordinary language.
31 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 12(1) (“Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is
not (a) a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is
living or has died within the preceding thirty years; (b) whether depicted, written or
sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or
French language of the character or quality of the wares or services in association with
which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions of or the persons employed
in their production or of their place of origin”).
32 TMA, ibid. at s. 12(2) (“a trade-mark that is not registrable by reason of paragraph
(1)(a) or (b) is registrable if it has been so used in Canada by the applicant or his
predecessor in title as to have become distinctive at the date of filing an application for
its registration”).
33 For a definition, see section I.(a)(ii)(A), below.
34 Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 187.
35 Daniel R. Bereskin, “Trade-Mark “Use” in Canada” (1997) 87 TMR 301 at 301; TMA
supra note 4 at s. 16.
36 Sheldon Burshtein, “Trade-Mark “Use” in Canada: The Who, What, Where, When,
Why and How — Part I” (1997) 11 I.P.J. 229 at 231.
37 Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 193; TMA, supra note 4 at ss. 30(a), 45 and 57.
38 Burshtein, supra note 36 at 235.
39 Cie générale des établissements Michelin — Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada (1996),
[1997] 2 F.C. 306 (Fed. T.D.); Bereskin, supra note 35 at 303-304.
40 Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co. (1968), 55 C.P.R. 176
(Can. Ex. Ct.) [Clairol]; Burshtein, supra note 36 at 235; Bereskin, Ibid., at 303.
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With respect to wares, a trade-mark is deemed to be used if “at the time of the
transfer of the property in or possession of the wares, in the normal course of trade,
it is marked on the wares themselves or on the packages in which they are distrib-
uted or it is in any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of the
association is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is trans-
ferred.41” The trade-mark must appear on the wares themselves or on their pack-
ages, or must be otherwise associated with the wares when the property or the pos-
session changes hands.
In the case of services, a mark is used when “it is used or displayed in the
performance or advertising of those services.42” To constitute use of a trade-mark
in Canada, it is important that the advertising of services be associated with the
performance of the services in Canada.43 The words “services” and “performance”
are not defined in the TMA. The meaning of each of them is a question of fact to be
determined in the circumstances of each case.44
(ii) Categories of Trade-Mark
(A) Traditional Trade-Marks
It is possible to separate trade-marks into five main categories: “classic” trade-
marks, service marks, distinguishing guises, certification marks and proposed
trade-marks.45 The classic trade-mark, the most common type, is one that distin-
guishes one person’s product from another’s. Pepsi and Coca-Cola are famous ex-
amples of “classic” trade-marks. Service mark, like its name suggests, is a mark
that distinguishes services performed by one person from those of another. In Can-
ada, service marks only became registrable in 1954.46 McDonald’s restaurant ser-
vices is a common illustration of a service mark. When appearance is used for the
purpose of distinguishing a product or service of one person from another, the way
wares or their containers are shaped, wrapped or packaged47may also constitute a
trade-mark know as distinguishing guises. For instance, the curved shape of the
Coca-Cola original glass bottle is sufficient to distinguish it from other drinks. Cer-
tification marks are marks that distinguish products or services of a defined stan-
dard from others. An example of a typical certification mark could be the use of
appellations of origin for foods and wines.48 The last category includes “proposed
trade-marks,” which, in fact, is not really a separate category. It is possible for an
applicant under the TMA to apply to register a trade-mark before using it unless the
41 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 4(1).
42 TMA, ibid., at s. 4(2).
43 Porter v. Don the Beachcomber (1966), 48 C.P.R. 280 (Can. Ex. Ct.); Sotiriadis &
Carrière, supra note 7 at 13; Bereskin, supra note 35 at 308; Burshtein, supra note 36
at 248.
44 Burshtein, Ibid. at 249.
45 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 2; Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 184.
46 Vaver, Ibid., at 185.
47 Ibid., at 187; TMA, supra note 4 at s. 2.
48 Vaver, Ibid. at 188.
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application is for a distinguishing guise or a certification mark.49 The applicant
needs, however, to intend to use it as a trade-mark in Canada.
(B) Non-Traditional Trade-Marks: What is a Sound Mark?
Non-traditional marks comprise trade-marks that are not perceived as conven-
tional. They are usually grouped into two major categories. The first category in-
cludes visible marks such as colour, shape, hologram and moving image. The sec-
ond comprises non-visible marks like sounds, scents and tastes.50 Sound marks
constitute our particular concern in this essay. According to the World Intellectual
Property Organization, sound marks may consist of: 
musical sounds, either pre-existing or specially commissioned for the pur-
poses of trademark registration. They may also consist of non-musical
sounds, either existing in nature (e.g. animal sounds or sounds produced by
meteorological or geographical features) or produced by machines and other
man-made devices.51
Similarly, the International Trademark Association defines sound marks as: 
This type of mark may be a jingle or any piece of music or other sound. It
may be a short extract from a composition or an entire musical piece. In
some cases, it may be a reproduction of an everyday sound, perhaps in an
unusual circumstance.52
A sound mark may be a jingle, a piece of music, an extract from a composi-
tion, an animal sound or any kind of sound as long as the sound mark distinguishes
a person’s wares or services from the wares or services of another.53 For instance,
the famous lion roar of MGM and the YaHOO Yodel have been registered in the
United States.54
(b) Registration in Canada: Common Law / Statutory Protection
Trade-marks can be protected in Canada through trade-mark registration (stat-
utory protection) and through common law protection, mainly by the common law
action of passing-off. While trade-marks are reasonably well protected by common
49 Ibid. at 186.
50 JF. Bretonnière & Sophie Rodari, “Global Protecting and Eenforcing Non-Traditional
Trademarks” (2009) Building and enforcing intellectual property value (IP Value 2009)
50 at 50.
51 WIPO, Standing Committee on the law of trademarks, industrial designs and geograph-
ical indications, Representation and Description of Non-Traditional Mmarks Possible
Areas of Convergence WIPO doc. SCT/19/2 (2008) 19th Sess. at 9 [SCT/19/2], online:
WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_19/sct_19_2.pdf>.
52 International Trademark Association, “Nontraditional Trademarks,” online: ITA
<http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=178&Itemid=59
&getcontent=1>.
53 Bretonnière & Rodari, supra note 50 at 51.
54 Reg. Number: 1395550 and 2442140.
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law, trade-mark registration is, nevertheless, frequently recommended as it pro-
vides important additional benefits.55
The registration of a trade-mark is valid across Canada, providing the owner
of the trade-mark with an exclusive right to use the mark throughout the country.56
The registration of a trade-mark in Canada may also be used as the basis for appli-
cations for similar protection in other countries.57 By contrast, the passing-off ac-
tion protects the trade-mark only in the area where it developed its reputation.58
Furthermore, to succeed in a passing-off action, three elements need to be proved
by the claimant: the existence of goodwill or reputation of the mark, the deception
of the public due to a misrepresentation, and actual or potential damage to the
plaintiff.59 However, the goodwill of the mark and the defendant’s misrepresenta-
tion can be very difficult and expensive to prove.60 On the other hand, registration
protects the trade-mark for goods and services for which it is registered without
needing to prove damages or an attempt to deceive the public.61
Moreover, if an action is brought, the registration of a trade-mark is presumed
to be valid for the goods and for the services for which it is registered.62 Registra-
tion also provides protection against the depreciation of the goodwill associated
with a trade-mark, even without any misrepresentation.63
Therefore, taking into account the various benefits and inconveniences, trade-
mark registration provides undeniable advantages and, nevertheless, seems desira-
ble in most cases to adequately protect a trade-mark.64 Understanding why sound
marks are not registrable in Canada and determining whether or not this position
should be maintained becomes a matter of great interest.
55 Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 175-176.
56 CIPO, A Guide to Trade-Marks, supra note 16 at 3; Pink Panther, supra note 15 at
para. 14.
57 Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 178.
58 Ibid.
59 Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.), at 132 [S.C.R.];
Kirkbi, supra note 17 at 66.
60 Vaver, “Unconventional,” supra note 1 at 3.
61 Pink Panther, supra note 15 at para. 14.
62 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 19; CIPO, A Guide to Trade-Marks, supra note 16 at 3; Vaver,
Intellectual, supra note 15 at 178.
63 TMA, ibid., at s. 22; CIPO, A Guide to Trade-Marks, Ibid.; Vaver, “Unconventional,”
supra note 1 at 5.
64 Chris Bennett & Jeannine Tse, “Why Sound Marks Law Needs to Catch Up in Canada”
(2009) Davis Publications at 14, online: <http://www.davis.ca/en/publications>.
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II. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING THE
REGISTRATION OF SOUND MARKS
(a) The Visual Requirement
(i) Current Doctrine Set by the Jurisprudence
In Canada, only one sound mark has successfully been registered as a trade-
mark. In 1989, Capitol Records registered a rapid burst of 11 musical notes for
audio tapes and quality services.65 However, the mark was expunged in 2005 be-
cause it was not renewed.66 Since 1989, applications to register sounds as trade-
marks have been systematically refused by CIPOs.67 This position relies on the
Federal Court of Canada’s Playboy decision.68
This case was an appeal from the decision of the Chairman of the opposition
board refusing to expunge the trade-mark Playboy in favour of the respondent
Michel Germain. The sole issue in the appeal before the Federal Court of Canada
was whether the respondent had satisfied the requirements of section 44 of the TMA
and had shown use of the trade-mark Playboy in association with hair pieces within
the meaning of the definition of “trade-mark” in section 2 and of “use” in section 4
of the TMA.69 Therefore, the issue was not the registrability or the definition of a
trade-mark, but rather whether the trade-mark constituted use in association with
wares.70
The Chairman of the Opposition Board’s position was based on paragraph 10
of the respondent’s affidavit, which states as follows: 
From 1983 to the present no “Playboy” label has been affixed to a hair piece
but rather the hair piece is verbally described to a customer and a purchaser
as a “Playboy” hair piece.71
The Chairman was of the view that the word “mark” in the definition of trade-
mark was “such a general term that it could potentially include within its scope
most any indication which can be perceived by the senses.72”
On judicial review, Pinard J. was of the opinion that the Chairman of the Op-
position Board erred in law when he made those conclusions. Pinard J. held that:
“the use of a verbal description is not use of a trade-mark within the meaning of the
65 Reg. number: TMA359318, online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/app/opiccipo/trdmrks/srch/
vwTrdmrk.do;jsessionid=00006XfvOoOzy0rJ6H0mEO95jbg:1247nfca5?lang=eng&
fileNumber=0553825&extension=0&startingDocumentIndexOnPage=1>; Sotiriadis &
Carrière, supra note 7 at 24.
66 Ibid.; Bennett & Tse, supra note 64 at 14.
67 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, correspondence dated May 15th, 2009, supra
note 1.
68 Playboy, supra note 22.
69 Ibid. at 520; Aerosol Fillers Inc. v. Plough (Canada) Ltd., [1981] 1 F.C. 679 (Fed.
C.A.), at 684 [F.C.].
70 Macera & Finlayson, supra note 9 at 9.
71 Playboy, supra note 22 at 521.
72 Ibid.
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Trade Marks Act. A “mark” must be something that can be represented visually.73”
Under this doctrine, trade-mark must be capable of being seen and, therefore, a
sound mark would not be a mark.
(ii) An Outdated Approach
Pinard J.’s interpretation of “mark” in the 1987 Playboy decision has major
consequences on registrability of sound marks in Canada. Even if the main issue in
this case was not the registrability of the mark but rather whether the mark consti-
tuted use in association with wares,74 CIPO’s position of refusing to register sound
marks is mainly based on Pinard J.’s interpretation of “mark.” This section will
discuss the reasons for which this interpretation seems to be quite restrictive with
today’s market place realities and should no longer be the standard for defining a
“mark.”
As the word “mark” is undefined in the legislation, interpretation of its mean-
ing becomes inevitable. In fact, according to the Canadian Report of the Trade-
marks Committee of 1953,75 there has intentionally been no definition of a “mark”
included in the TMA in order to avoid a potentially restrictive interpretation.76 It
can, therefore, be argued that this open-ended definition suggests that the word
“mark” should evolve with the constant development of society.77 This position
would be consistent with other types of intellectual property. For instance, in patent
law,78 an invention is broadly defined as: “any new and useful art, process, ma-
chine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.”79 Therefore,
the definition of what constitutes an invention is broad because the law does not
precisely define what technology is patentable as it is not possible for the legislator
to anticipate what kinds of technologies will be developed in the future.80
In the Playboy decision, Pinard J. based his interpretation of what constitutes a
“mark” on the “ordinary meaning” of the word “mark” that was adopted in two
older cases of 1931 and 1979.81 With the globalization of markets, the advent of
73 Ibid., at 522.
74 Macera & Finlayson, supra note 9 at 12.
75 Harold G. Fox, The Canadian Law of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 2d ed.,
v.2, (Toronto: Carswell, 1956) at 1142; C.A.P.A.C. v. Maple Leaf Broadcasting Co., 18
C.P.R. 1, 1953 CarswellNat 1, [1953] Ex. C.R. 130, 13 Fox Pat. C. 101 (S.C.C.).
76 Katharine McGinnis, “Whether Sound Marks Can and/or Should Be Registered as
Trade-Marks in Canada” (2005) 19 Intellectual Property Journal 117 at 121.
77 Vanessa Mackie, “Scent Marks The Future of Canadian Trade-Mark Law” (2004/2005)
18 Intellectual Property Journal 417 at 421.
78 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4 [Patent Act].
79 Ibid., at s. 2.
80 Ibid.
81 Wright & Ropes Ltd. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., [1931] Ex. C.R. 143; Insurance
Corporation of British Columbia v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1979), 44 C.P.R. (2d) 1
(Fed. T.D.); Playboy, supra note 22 at 522; Justine Wiebe, “Recent Canadian IP Office
Proposals Recognize Non-Traditional Trade-Marks” (2005) 25 The Lawyers Weekly 2
at para. 4.
42   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [8:1 C.J.L.T.]
the Internet and the increasing use of new technologies and of modern branding
strategies, the adoption of a definition of the word “mark” (relying on a definition
dating back to 1931), which imposes a visual requirement, seems to have become
an outdated approach that is inconsistent with today’s realities.82 The definition of
the word “mark” should evolve with the development of society and not be limited
to something that can be represented visually. This position is consistent with intel-
lectual property law in general, for example, in the Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings
Inc.83 decision, Lebel J. states that “[t]he vast and expanding domain of the law of
intellectual property is going through a period of major and rapid changes. The
pressures of globalization and technological change challenge its institutions, its
classifications and sometimes settled doctrines.84” Therefore, the ordinary meaning
of the word “mark” is likely to have changed since 1931 to follow modern develop-
ments and, thus, is not necessarily the same.
Moreover, the requirement of being visually represented is certainly not in the
TMA. “Trade-mark” is defined in section 2 of the TMA as a mark capable of being
distinguished.85 Nothing in the TMA appears to restrict a trade-mark only to what is
visible, and section 2 of the TMA does not explicitly preclude a sound from being
registrable as a mark.86 Notably, there is no enumeration or exclusion of what can
be a trade-mark.87 Furthermore, the definition of “trade-mark” seems to be broad
enough to encompass a sound mark because it is defined as a “mark.” Protecting
marks that are capable of distinguishing the source of the wares or services is one
of the primary goals of the TMA. The concept of trade-mark should, therefore, be
interpreted broadly in view of this purpose. Emphasis should be put on whether the
sound is distinctive enough to distinguish the wares and services of one source
from those of another.88 The nature of the mark alone should not prevent its
registration.89
On the other hand, from a general perspective, a substantive policy matter re-
lated to the privatization of cultural assets in the public domain still remains.90 Af-
ter the expiry of copyright, a work falls into the public domain. In principle, it may
be freely used, reproduced or communicated. The intention behind this principle is
82 Burshtein, supra note 36 at 234 (“The validity of the restriction to visual marks is
based on a historical, and I submit, outdated interpretation of the word ‘mark.’ How-
ever, a non-visual use of a registered mark could constitute a infringement under sec-
tion 20 because the activities constituting infringement are not limited to visual uses”);
McGinnis, supra note 76 at 121; Canto, supra note 7 at 53.
83 Kirkbi, supra note 17.
84 Kirkbi, ibid., at para. 37.
85 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 2 (“a mark that is used by a person for the purpose of distin-
guishing or so as to distinguish wares or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired or
performed by him from those manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by
others”).
86 Sotiriadis & Carrière, supra note 7 at 25.
87 Ibid.
88 Canto, supra note 7 at 55-56.
89 McGinnis, supra note 76 at 122.
90 Vaver, “Unconventional,” supra note 1 at 10.
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to enhance the availability of works to the public and, thus, it may have a positive
effect on creativity and on the development of new works.91 Therefore, the acquisi-
tion by companies of trade-mark rights, for instance, of musical songs fallen into
the public domain, raises several issues. If a company acquires such rights, it can
prevent a third party, in the course of trade, from using the same mark or a similar
one with regard to identical or similar goods or services.92 However, the use of
such a trade-mark, for private studies or teaching,93 for example, will not fall
within the scope of the trade-mark owner’s exclusive right. The company will, thus,
“partially” privatize a work that was previously part of the public domain. Such
works may be important musical creations that have become part of our cultural
heritage, and some concerns may be raised about the legitimacy of an individual’s
appropriation of such works for trade purposes.94 For some, it is “an unnecessary
encouragement for the whole public domain music repertoire to be privately re-
appropriated for commercial ends.”95
While these concerns must be seriously taken into account, it is important to
keep in mind that such appropriation is partial and will not prevent the use of the
registered musical mark for purposes not related to trade. Furthermore, trade-mark
rights of public domain works would only constitute a part of what could be regis-
tered as sound marks, since sound marks may also be invented and non-musical. It
has also been mentioned that the free use of musical works in the public domain by
all traders may possibly confuse consumers.96 For instance, if a company has used
a musical work in such a way that consumers associate this distinctive musical
work with its products or services, then the use of the same musical work by other
companies could create confusion in the minds of consumers. Furthermore, such
associations are often the result of substantial investment in marketing by the com-
pany. The use of the same musical work as trade-mark by other companies may be
seen as unfair free-riding on the trade-mark’s reputation.97
(iii) An International Perspective
While Canada is reluctant to register sound marks, other jurisdictions have
decided otherwise on this issue. The United States, the European Union and Aus-
tralia allow sound marks to be registered.
91 WIPO, Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geo-
graphical Indications, Relation of Established Trademark Principles to New Types of
Marks, WIPO doc. SCT/17/3 (2007) 17th Sess. at 10 [SCT/17/3].
92 SCT/16/5, supra note 28 at 21; Article 16(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, online: WTO
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm>; TMA, supra note 4 at s.
19.
93 i.e., for purposes which are not trade-related.
94 SCT/16/5, supra note 28 at 21.
95 Vaver, “Unconventional,” supra note 1 at 10.
96 SCT/16/5, supra note 28 at 21.
97 Ibid.
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In the United States, the federal courts have expressly accepted the validity of
sound marks. Their registration is commonplace today.98 For example, the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) was the first to register the sound mark NBC
chimes in 1950 for its radio broadcast services99 and the famous lion roar of MGM
was registered in 1986.100 The Lanham Act codifies United States trademark law
and defines a trade-mark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof”101 that identifies and distinguishes a person’s goods and services. Ju-
risprudence in the United States has a broad enough interpretation of the definition
to include sounds.102 In Re General Electric Broadcasting Co. decision, the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeals Board (T.T.A.B.) stated that the nature of a mark was not a
basis for refusing to register a trade-mark, if it acts as an indication of source;
sounds may function as source indicators.103 Likewise, in Paramount Pictures
Corp., the T.T.A.B. held that “. . . our trademark law is very liberal . . . as to what
is registrable subject matter and that sounds may be registered as trademarks.”104
Therefore, the registration of sound marks is well accepted in the United States.
In the European Union, sound marks are registrable. The EU First Trademark
Directive (89/104/EEC) includes this definition of trademark: “A trademark may
consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words,
including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their
packaging, provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods and
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.”105 This definition
contains examples of trademarks, and in the Shield Mark decision,106 the European
Court of Justice held that the list was not exhaustive.107 Therefore, the focus in
trade-mark registration is on whether the mark in question is capable of distinguish-
ing the source of the goods or services and is capable of being represented graphi-
cally. If the two requirements are met, the registration cannot be refused on the
basis of the intangible nature of the mark.108 However, as we will discuss below,
these conditions are quite restrictive.
98 Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001), approving Re General Electric
Broadcasting Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B., 1978) [General Electric]; Vaver, “Un-
conventional,” supra note 1 at 8.
99 Reg. Number: 0523616; Mélissa E. Roth, “Something Old, Something New, Some-
thing Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Re-
gistrations” (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 457 at 485.
100 Reg. Number: 1395550; Bretonnière & Rodari, supra note 50 at 50.
101 Lanham Act, s. 45, 15 U.S.C. 1127.
102 McGinnis, supra note 76 at 122.
103 General Electric, supra note 98 at 562-563.
104 Paramount Pictures Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. 1111 at 1113 (T.T.A.B., 1982).
105 Bretonnière & Rodari, supra note 50 at 52.
106 Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist, C-283/01, [2003] E.T.M.R. 64 [Shield Mark].
107 Sarah Playle & Sarah Hodson, “Registering Sounds as Trade Marks” (2004) 11 Journal
of Brand Management 331 at 332.
108 Shield Mark, supra note 106.
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In Australia, trade marks law has been amended to expressly include sounds
within the definition of a sign.109 The Trade Marks Act 1995 defines a trade mark
as “a sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with
or provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with
or provided by any other person.”110 Then, at section 6, a “sign” includes the fol-
lowing or any combination of the following, namely, any letter, word, name, signa-
ture, numeral, device, brand, heading, label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, col-
our, sound or scent.111 Since these modifications, many applications for sound
marks’ registration have been filed. To date, thirty-eight sound marks are registered
and three are pending in Australia.112
The position of United States, Europe and Australia in relation to the registra-
bility of sound marks reveals the changing realities of branding norms and the
evolution of business over the past years. Canada should take into account the posi-
tion of these jurisdictions in order to ensure its presence in a modern marketplace
framework.
(b) The Issue of “Use”
It is very important that a trade-mark fulfills the requirement of “use” in the
sense of section 4 of the TMA,113 as failing to do so may result in expungement of
its registration.114 On the basis that a “mark” must be something that can be repre-
sented visually,115 Pinard J. ruled in the Playboy decision that: 
in order to be deemed to be used in association with wares, at the time of the
transfer of the property in or possession of such wares, the trade mark must
be something that can be seen, whether it is marked on the wares them-
109 One of the purposes of the introduction of the Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)
was to broaden the definition of a trade mark. The Australian Trade Marks Act 1995
(Cth), other than Part 1, commences on 1 January 1996 and The Australian Trade
Marks Act 1994 is repealed.
110 Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) at s. 17
111 Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) at s. 6
112 As of April 20, 2010.
113 TMA, supra note 4 at s.4.
(1) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with wares if, at
the time of the transfer of the property in or possession of the wares, in
the normal course of trade, it is marked on the wares themselves or on
the packages in which they are distributed or it is in any other manner
so associated with the wares that notice of the association is then given
to the person to whom the property or possession is transferred.
(2) A trade-mark is deemed to be used in association with services if it is
used or displayed in the performance or advertising of those services.
(3) A trade-mark that is marked in Canada on wares or on the packages in
which they are contained is, when the wares are exported from Canada,
deemed to be used in Canada in association with those wares.
114 TMA, supra note 4 at ss. 45, 57, 18(1), 38(2)(a), 30(b); Sotiriadis & Carrière, supra
note 7 at 15.
115 Playboy, supra note 22 at 522.
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selves or on the packages in which they are distributed or whether it is in
any other manner so associated with the wares that notice of the association
is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is
transferred.116
If a trade-mark must be something that can be seen in order to be deemed to
be used in association with wares, then, it eliminates the possibility of showing use
of non-visual marks such as sound marks. However, as discussed above, such an
interpretation of what may constitute a “mark” seems to be outdated. The nature of
the mark should not be a barrier to its registration if this mark is used to distinguish
one person’s wares or services from those of another.117
Moreover, there appears to be no persuasive reason why a mark that can be
visually depicted when used, for example, when the mark is marked on the wares,
should be distinguished from a mark that cannot. Judge Pinard understood the
words “in any other manner” in s. 4(1) of the TMA as simply meaning that the mark
can be associated with the wares by another manner than by being marked on the
wares themselves or on the packages and still be visible.118 This seems to be an
unduly restrictive interpretation of section 4 of the TMA. For some, the words “in
any other manner” and generally, the issue of use, should be interpreted with more
flexibility; “[t]he issue of use, like all other factual issues must be regarded flexibly
and creatively and should not be used as a device to limit registrability.119” Even if
a sound mark cannot be marked on the wares themselves or on the packages, a
sound mark could still be considered to be in another way associated with the
goods.120 The wording “in any other manner so associated with wares” of section 4
of the TMA could be interpreted as encompassing non-visual marks that cannot
logically be fixed to the wares themselves or on the packages, but can be associated
by other manners. Many countries have already accommodated the registration of
non-visual marks, like sound marks, and it is still an open possibility for Canada.
As discussed, the fundamental consideration for registration should be whether or
not a sound mark is used or could be used to distinguish the goods or services of
one party from another.121
However, even if we were to establish that the interpretation of the definition
of “mark” and “use” are outdated and that they should include visual and non-
visual marks, additional complexities remain. The substantial differences of the
definition of “use” and whether it is used in relation to goods or services, as dis-
cussed earlier in this article remains problematic.122 These differences could gener-
116 Playboy, supra note 22 at 523 [emphasis added].
117 Philip Lapin, “Smart & Biggar Response to CIPO Request for Comments — Re: Pro-
posed Modernization of Trade-Mark Act” (2005) Smart & Biggar at 11, online:
<http://www.smart-biggar.ca/assets/CIPOResponse.pdf>.
118 Playboy, supra note 22 at 523.
119 Macera & Finlayson, supra note 9 at 13.
120 Ibid.
121 International Trademark Association, Non-Traditional Trademarks Taskforce Issues
and Policy Group, “A report on the Protection of Sound Trademarks” (1997) at 14,
online: ITA <http://www.inta.org/downloads/tap_sound1997.pdf>.
122 For more details, see section I.(a)(i)(C), above.
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ate difficulties in relation to the use of sound marks with wares. Actually, it would
be common that sound marks be used through advertising, like in the case of jin-
gles, or performance. However, a mark for services can be “used” in a television
commercial or generally in non-point of sale advertising, whereas a mark for wares
cannot.123 Moreover, with respect to use in relation to wares, section 4 of the TMA
requires that the association between the trade-mark and the wares be made “at the
time of the transfer of the property in or possession of the wares.” This requirement
may raise some difficulties because the consumer may only listen to the sound
mark after the time of purchase, when he will have bought and used the product.124
For example, if a consumer purchases a videotape produced by MGM, he will hear
the “lion’s roar” only when he plays it, not at the cash register.125 At the moment of
purchase, the sound mark is not visible and is inaudible because the consumer will
only listen to the videotape at home. Therefore, the sound mark may only become
apparent to the consumer after the time of the transfer of the property in or posses-
sion of the wares.
To meet this requirement, some have proposed that the sound mark could be
identified on the wares via written descriptions or graphical representations. How-
ever, this proposition may be difficult to implement. Would a merchant really affix
to wares a graphic representation of the sound mark such as a musical notation on a
stave? This solution does not seem to be feasible. Another possibility is to rely on
jurisprudence dealing with the use of computer software marks. It was held that the
display of a trade-mark on a computer screen, when the software was installed
(thus after purchase), qualified as use within the meaning of section 4 of the TMA,
even if the trade-mark had not been physically applied to a diskette or a package
containing the software.126 Therefore, it is arguable that the same logic could be
extended to sound marks, which are only available to consumers after purchas-
ing.127 Using marketing techniques, such as putting in place interactive displays
and advertising involving the sound mark at the point of sale could reinforce this
position.128
123 Clairol, supra note 40; Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 193; McGinnis, supra note
76 at 125.
124 Wiebe, supra note 81 at 1; Sotiriadis & Carrière, supra note 7 at 27.
125 Macera & Finlayson, supra note 9 at 12.
126 Justine Weibe, “A Sense-ible Approach to Non-Traditional Trade-Marks” (2001) Ber-
eskin & Parr publication at 7, online: Bereskin & Parr <http://www.bereskinparr.com/
FRE/News/IntellectualPropertyArticles/pdf/TM%20Sense-ible%20Wiebe.pdf>; Mc-
Ginnis, supra note 76 at 126; BMB Compuscience Canada Ltd. v. Bramalea Ltd.
(1988), [1989] 1 F.C. 362 (Fed. T.D.); R. c. Locquet (1985), 5 C.P.R. (3d) 173 (Que.
C.S.P.) (Similarly, use may comprise the appearance of a trade-mark on a video screen
when produced by a computer program); Riches, McKenzie & Herbert v. Source
Telecomputing Corp. (1992), 46 C.P.R. (3d) 563 (T.M. Bd.) (It has been held that the
display of a trade-mark on the screen is use of the trade-mark in association with com-
puter telephone access services).
127 Mackie, supra note 77 at 423.
128 Ibid; McGinnis, supra note 76 at 125-126.
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(c) Sound Marks’ Distinctiveness
(i) Inherently Distinctive or Acquired?
Like traditional trade-marks, a sound mark must be distinctive in order to reg-
ister goods or services to which it is applied. As discussed above, distinctiveness
can be inherent or can be acquired through use, i.e., secondary meaning.129 Some
have suggested that non-traditional marks are unlikely to be regarded as inherently
distinctive. It is argued that consumers do not typically view these marks as indica-
tors of distinctive sources and, therefore, non-traditional marks would always need
secondary meaning.130 While this argument may be right for some types of non-
traditional marks, such as shape or color marks, sounds have been used for a long
time in the marketplace to distinguish companies and their products in order to
reach consumers; jingles in advertisements are commonly used for this purpose.131
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that, in some cases, a consumer who hears a
unique sound may in fact associate it as an indicator of source of specific goods or
services.132
In the United States, for instance, sound marks can be inherently distinctive,
whereas color marks can never be and may only be registered on a showing of
secondary meaning.133 Indeed, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. deci-
sion,134 the Supreme Court of the United States held that no color mark can ever be
inherently distinctive because: “a product’s color is unlike “fanciful,” “arbitrary,”
or “suggestive” words or designs, which almost automatically tell a customer that
they refer to a brand.”135 However, a color mark may develop secondary meaning
over time. Therefore, a color mark could be protected as a trademark, but only upon
a showing of secondary meaning. The Supreme Court of the United States has reit-
erated this position in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc. decision in
2000.136 Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in Re General Electric
Broadcasting Co.137 the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board mentioned that, like
traditional trade-marks, sound marks may vary in terms of distinctiveness. A dis-
tinction must be made between sound marks that are “unique, different, or distinc-
tive” and those that “resemble or imitate commonplace sounds or those to which
listeners have been exposed under different circumstances.”138 In the situation
129 Roth, supra note 99 at 468.
130 Kevin K. McCormick, ““Ding You Are Now Free to Register that Sound” (2006) 96
TMR 1101 at 1119.
131 Ibid; McGinnis, supra note 76 at 131-132.
132 Ibid.
133 General Electric, supra note 98; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159,
34 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1161 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1995) [Qualitex]; Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara
Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 2000) [Wal-Mart]; Roth, supra note 99 at 472;
McGinnis, supra note 76 at 131.
134 Qualitex, ibid.
135 Ibid. at 163; Wal-Mart, supra note 133.
136 Ibid.
137 General Electric, supra note 98.
138 Ibid. at 563.
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where the mark is formed by commonplace sounds, the applicant must provide evi-
dence that the mark has acquired secondary meaning.139 These distinctions are
made in accordance with the standard traditional trade-mark’s spectrum of distinc-
tiveness in Canada, i.e., from fanciful marks to generic ones. Indeed, an invented
and fanciful word like “Kodak” would generally possess more inherent distinctive-
ness than a suggestive mark such as “mini-wheat” when used in relation to cere-
als.140 Considering that a unique invented sound mark is more likely to be inher-
ently distinctive than a commonplace one, seems to be in compliance with current
practices surrounding traditional trade-marks in Canada. CIPO should make a dis-
tinction between unique or fanciful sounds and commonplace sounds in terms of
distinctiveness, similar to what has been done in the United States.
(ii) Proof of Secondary Meaning
Proof of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning of a sound mark,
based on section 12(2) of the TMA, could be conducted like it is usually done with
traditional trade-marks. The evidence of acquired secondary meaning must be
strong and convincing in order to prove that a mark is distinctive. Thus, the onus on
an applicant who contends that a mark has come to acquire distinctiveness could be
a heavy one.141 Moreover, some have mentioned that consumers are not necessa-
rily used to making a correlation between products or services and non-traditional
marks, such as sound marks, as much as they are for traditional ones. It could,
therefore, be even more difficult to establish the acquired distinctiveness of a sound
mark than of a word mark.142 However, proving that a mark has acquired a secon-
dary meaning must be presented in a factual manner. Therefore, depending on the
case, establishing a secondary meaning for a sound mark could be more or less
difficult. For instance, it could be easier to establish a secondary meaning for a
well-known sound mark, such as the Pillsbury Giggle.
Proof that a mark has come to acquired distinctiveness may be filed by way of
affidavit or statutory declaration meeting the requirements of section 32(1) of the
TMA.143 The application must first contain a master affidavit submitted by some-
139 John Gabrielides & Thomas Williams, “The Sound of Unconventional Marks in the
United States” (2007) World Trademark Review (July 10) at 95.
140 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Trade-Marks Examination Manual (1996) at 73,
online: <http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-in-
ternetopic.nsf/eng/wr01644.html> [TMEM].
141 Ibid. at 196; Standard Coil Products (Canada) Ltd. v. Standard Radio Corp. (1971), 1
C.P.R. (2d) 155 (Fed. T.D.), at 172 [C.P.R.], affirmed (1976), 1976 CarswellNat 529
(Fed. C.A.); Carling Breweries Ltd. v. Molson Cos. (1984), 1 C.P.R. (3d) 191 (Fed.
T.D.); affirmed (1988), 1988 CarswellNat 539 (Fed. C.A.).
142 SCT/17/3, supra note 91 at 4.
143 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 32(1) (“An applicant who claims that his trade-mark is registra-
ble under subsection 12(2) or section 13 shall furnish the Registrar with evidence by
way of affidavit or statutory declaration establishing the extent to which and the time
during which the trade-mark has been used in Canada and with any other evidence that
the Registrar may require in support of the claim”).
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one having first-hand knowledge of the current situation.144 The affidavit should
contain certain information, such as: a statement of the nature of use of the mark in
association with the wares or services, the length of time and the extent of this
use,145 an explanation related to the association of the mark at the time of the trans-
fer of property or possession of the wares, etc.146 As discussed earlier,147 this last
element may be problematic in some cases in which sound marks are used in rela-
tion with wares. Indeed, sound marks may only be heard after the transfer of pro-
perty or possession of the goods. Additional affidavits from distributors, advertis-
ing agencies, retailers and users of the goods, who can attest to the secondary
meaning of the mark, may also be submitted, although they are not usually
required.148
Finally, surveys may also be used as evidence that the mark has acquired dis-
tinctiveness.149 Indeed, surveys and their results are currently commonly used by
companies for many of their business decisions. However, to be accepted as evi-
dence, an expert in designing and interpreting survey results must carry it out.
Moreover, the strategy and the statistical basis of the survey needs to be estab-
lished, and the form and type of questions asked have to be explained.150 There-
fore, a properly conducted survey can normally be accepted as evidence. For in-
stance, surveys have been admissible as evidence of secondary meaning in
Aluminium Goods Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks151 and in Canadian Schenley
Distilleries Ltd. v. Canada’s Manitoba Distillery Ltd.152 In the case of sound
marks, surveys could be done by phone or by the Internet; respondents would, thus,
be able to listen to the sound mark in issue in order to answer the survey’s
questions.
(iii) The Doctrine of Functionality
In Canada, the registration of a mark should not interfere with the use of any
utilitarian feature embodied in this mark.153 If the mark is mainly functional,
namely when the feature is “solely, primarily or essentially” functional, the mark
144 TMEM, supra note 140 at 190-191.
145 Ibid., at 191-192 (“The extent of use may be stated in terms of units, dollar volume of
sales, or percentage of the market for the wares or services performed, sold, leased or
hired in association with the mark. The evidence may refer to the mode of distribution,
the number of distributors, and the number of outlets in which the product or services
associated with the mark is offered for sale”).
146 See TMEM, ibid., at 191.
147 See section II.(b), above.
148 TMEM, supra note 140 at 192.
149 Ibid., at 192-193.
150 Ibid., at 193.
151 Aluminium Goods Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1954), 19 C.P.R. 93 (Can. Ex.
Ct.).
152 Canadian Schenley Distilleries Ltd. v. Canada’s Manitoba Distillery Ltd. (1975), 25
C.P.R. (2d) 1 (Fed. T.D.).
153 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 13(2).
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cannot be distinctive and thus, is unregistrable.154 For example, in a case involving
the well-known LEGO construction sets for children, the trial judge found that the
“LEGO indicia”155 was purely functional and, therefore, could not be the basis of a
trade-mark, whether registered or unregistered.156 This doctrine of functionality re-
flects the essence of the purpose of trade-marks. It recognized that trade-marks are
intended to protect the distinctiveness of a product, not to create and to protect a
monopoly on the product that could ultimately prevent fair competition within the
industry.157 This logical principle of trade-mark law has also been incorporated
into the Lanham Act in the United States158 and is applied in Europe by a directive
of the European Commission.159
The functionality doctrine is not an absolute obstacle to the registration of
sound marks in Canada. As for a traditional mark, if a sound mark is distinctive and
is not primarily functional, then the registration should not be barred. However,
commonplace sounds may face particular challenges related to the doctrine of func-
tionality.160 For example, the sound of a lawn mower motor would not be registra-
ble in relation to lawn mowers without evidence of factual distinctiveness. Indeed,
such registration could block legitimate competition from other traders, who need
to use the sound of lawn mower motors for their similar goods. Similarly, the appli-
cation of registration for a Harley Davidson muffler sound161 caused a lot of dis-
cussion in the United States. Nine motorcycle competitors raised objections to its
registration invoking that the exhaust sound was purely functional. On the other
hand, Harley Davidson argued that while the mark was utilitarian in origin, there
were modifications to the engine resulting in a unique sound. The issue of whether
the Harley Davidson muffler sound was functional was never decided because Har-
154 Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 192; Remington Rand Corp. v. Philips Electronics
N.V. (1995), 64 C.P.R. (3d) 467 (Fed. C.A.), at 475 [C.P.R.], leave to appeal refused
(1996), 1996 CarswellNat 3160 (S.C.C.); McGinnis, supra note 76 at 132.
155 Kirkbi, supra note 17 at para. 2 (“the upper surface of the block with eight studs dis-
tributed in a regular geometric pattern”).
156 Ibid., at 40–61.
157 Ibid., at 42-43 (“It reflects the purpose of a trade-mark, which is the protection of the
distinctiveness of the product, not of a monopoly on the product”).
158 Lanham Act, supra note 101 at s. 1052(e)(5); TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing
Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23 at 34 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 2001); Wal-Mart, supra note 133 at
211 (The Supreme Court of the United States has held that purely functional features
may not become the basis of trade-marks); Kirkbi, supra note 17 at 48.
159 First Council Directive 89/104, Encyclopedia of European Community Law (EEC), art.
3(1)(e); see also L. Bently & B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (2nd ed. 2004) at
794–96; Kirkbi, Ibid., at 49 (“EU does not allow the registration of purely functional
trade-marks. It prohibits the registration as marks of signs which consist exclusively of
a shape which is necessary to obtain a technical result”).
160 SCT/17/3, supra note 91 at 8.
161 Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. v. H-D Michigan, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1521 (T.T.A.B.,
1997) [Kawasaki Motors Corp.] (“the exhaust sound of the applicant’s motorcycles
produced by V-Twin, common crankpin motorcycle engines when the goods are in
use”); Sotiriadis & Carrière, supra note 7 at 31.
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ley Davidson abandoned its application in 2000.162 Therefore, applicants should be
aware that if the sound mark has a primarily functional use, the application could
be refused.163
(d) The Possibility of Overlapping with Copyright Protection
In the case of a sound mark consisting of musical sounds, it could be possible
that a single sound mark may also be protected as a “musical work” under the
Copyright Act.164 Indeed, a musical sound mark can be protected by copyright as-
suming that it fulfills the criteria required under the Copyright Act, such as the
criteria of originality and of fixation.165 The fact that a sound mark can also be
protected by copyright should not be a major obstacle to its registration as a trade-
mark as the coexistence of copyright and trade-mark has “already been recognized,
especially with respect to artistic works.”166
The possibility of overlap between trade-mark and copyright law was dis-
cussed in the recent Euro-Excellence decision,167 in which the Supreme Court of
Canada established whether or not “a work of art appearing on a label and receiv-
ing trade-mark protection could also be the subject of copyright protection.”168 The
Court concluded that section 64 of the Copyright Act was adopted by the Parlia-
ment having in mind that works could receive concurrent copyright and trade-mark
protection.169 By enacting section 64, the Parliament authorized the possibility of
such overlap.
This interpretation was made in the case of artistic work, in which the object
of protection was a logo on a chocolate bar wrapper. The question, whether the
same logic could be extended to sound marks and musical work, may be asked.
Nothing seems to prevent us from extending the same logic to sound marks and
musical work. In fact, the Court stated in a general way that, “[i]n contrast, s.
64(3)(b) of the Copyright Act permits a single work to be the subject of both copy-
right and trade-mark protection. In other words, Parliament has authorized an over-
lap between copyright and trade-mark.”170 This interpretation seems broad enough
to encompass many different kinds of work.
162 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1120.
163 TMEM, supra note 140 at 99.
164 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 2.
165 Copyright Act, supra note 164 at s. 5(1) (“Subject to this Act, copyright shall subsist in
Canada, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in every original literary, dramatic, musi-
cal and artistic work . . .”); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.); Vaver, Intellectual, supra note 15 at 41.
166 Sotiriadis & Carrière, supra note 7 at 25; Hugues G. Richard (dir.) et al., Canadian
Copyright Act Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1993) at S5.9.2–S7.1.5.
167 Kraft Canada Inc. c. Euro Excellence Inc., 2007 CarswellNat 2087, (sub nom. Euro
Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc.) [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 (S.C.C.).
168 Ibid., at para. 9.
169 Copyright Act, supra note 164 at s. 64(3)(b) (“(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in
respect of the copyright or the moral rights in an artistic work in so far as the work is
used as or for: (b) a trade-mark or a representation thereof or a label”)
170 Euro-Excellence, supra note 167 at para.13.
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Furthermore, while it is important to keep in mind the distinctions between
different forms of intellectual property and their legal and economic functions,171
the Court specified that this guiding principle should be completed “by the proviso:
except where Parliament provides otherwise.”172 Therefore, because Parliament
has authorized the duality of protection provided by trade-mark and copyright, the
Court is bound to conclude that such concurrence is possible. This logic is also in
accordance with the reasoning in the Kirkbi decision where the Court relied on the
functionality doctrine, incorporated in s. 13(2) of the TMA, in order to rule that
there could be no overlap between patent and trade-mark. Indeed, while the Court
mentioned that trade-mark law should not be interpreted in a way that undermines
patent law, the decision was based on the actual functionality doctrine and its cor-
relative provision in the TMA, which “precluded the granting of trade-mark protec-
tion to functional works, which are the subjects of patent law.”173 Following this
reasoning, and until the Parliament provides otherwise, the overlap between copy-
right and trade-mark protection is possible and should not be a barrier to the regis-
tration of sound marks.
With these points in mind, a more fundamental issue remains. While copyright
protection is limited in time, the trade-mark owner may enjoy exclusive rights in-
definitely, if the trade-mark is used and renewed every 15 years.174 Therefore, one
may wonder if copyright protection could be extended beyond its natural term
through trade-mark protection, similar to what LEGO was trying to do in the Kirkbi
decision when its patent expired. In this decision, it was mentioned that trade-mark
law should not be used in a way to perpetuate monopoly rights enjoyed under a
patent’s protection when it expires.175 In terms of copyright law, the question is
whether the objectives underlying the temporally limited protection of copyright in
a work can be reconciled with the maintenance of trade-mark protection in the
same work after copyright has expired. For some, the work should fall into the
public domain completely. For others, it could be acceptable if it became free for
uses that are not covered by the scope of trade-mark rights. For instance, uses that
are not trade-related or uses in trade that do not concern the same or similar prod-
ucts or services.176
Lastly, when a company is using sounds as trade-marks, it should be aware
that these sounds may already be protected under copyright. Therefore, without the
authorization of the copyright owner, the use of the musical work in question or a
substantial part of it as a trade-mark could constitute an unauthorized reproduction
according to section 3 of the Copyright Act and, thus, an infringement in the sense
of section 27 of the same Act. This possibility should always be carefully consid-
ered when applying for the registration of trade-marks in order to avoid copyright
infringement.
171 Kirkbi, supra note 17 at para. 37; Euro-Excellence, supra note 167 at para. 13.
172 Euro-Excellence, ibid. at para. 13.
173 Ibid. at para. 12.
174 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 46; Copyright Act, supra note 164 at s. 6; SCT/16/5, supra note
28 at 20.
175 Kirkbi, supra note 17 at paras. 40–61.
176 SCT/16/5, supra note 28 at 20.
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III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
DESCRIPTION OF SOUND MARKS
(a) The Difficulty of Describing Sounds
In many jurisdictions, such as the United States, Australia and the European
Union, there is a requirement for some form of graphical representation within
trade-mark legislation. This graphic representation requirement constitutes one of
the most problematic issues related to the registration of sound marks. In Canada,
unless the application for a mark only consists of a word, or words, not depicted in
a special form, an applicant needs to file a drawing of the trade-mark in order to
register it.177 Translating a non-visual mark, such as a sound mark, into a visual
representation, a drawing, can be a challenge. Indeed, the sound mark needs to be
clearly translated into a graphic representation in order to keep the essence of the
registration.178 The form of graphic representation should also allow the public to
consult and understand the nature of the mark and the scope of protection.179 Con-
sequently, a very technical description or a non-accessible or unusual mode of rep-
resentation would be considered inappropriate.180
Therefore, it is essential to evaluate if the drawing representation system is the
appropriate method for indexing sound marks in Canada. Other jurisdictions in
which these difficulties have not prevented the registration of sound marks may
offer guidance for Canada in order to establish how sounds can be adequately de-
scribed and depicted for indexing and searching purposes. In turn, three representa-
tion systems will be discussed: the United States’ descriptive representation system,
the European Union’s graphic representation system and Australia’s hybrid repre-
sentation system.181
(b) Existent Graphical Representation Systems
(i) United States’ Descriptive Representation System
Various sound marks are currently registered in the United States. Some well-
known examples of these sound marks are the MGM Lion Roar, the YaHOO Yodel
and the Pillsbury Giggle.182 In fact, the United States has adopted the most liberal
177 TMA, supra note 4 at s. 30(h) (“An applicant for the registration of a trade-mark shall
file with the Registrar an application containing: (h) unless the application is for the
registration only of a word or words not depicted in a special form, a drawing of the
trade-mark and such number of accurate representations of the trade-mark as may be
prescribed”).
178 McGinnis, supra note 76 at 134.
179 SCT/19/2, supra note 51 at 3 (“Most importantly, in relation to non-traditional marks,
the representation should demonstrate the nature of the mark and show its features
clearly enough to permit proper examination and at a later stage, adequate determina-
tion of the nature and scope of the protection granted to a particular sign”).
180 Ibid.
181 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1105.
182 Macera & Finlayson, supra note 9 at 3; Reg. number: 1395550, 2442140 and 2692077.
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approach of any jurisdiction to the registration of sound marks.183 As long as the
mark is used as an indicator of source and meets statutory requirements, it should
be registrable.184 The way that a sound mark is filed in the United States is de-
scribed in sections 807.09, 1202.13 and 1202.15 of the Trademark Manual of Ex-
amination Procedure (TMEP). A sound mark is defined in the TMEP as a mark
that “identifies and distinguishes a product or service through audio rather than
visual means.”185 Following this definition, a detailed description of the sound
mark is required, whereas no drawing needs to be submitted. The detailed descrip-
tion of the sound mark is recognized “as the accepted scope of the mark being
sought.”186 The applicant can also submit an audio or video reproduction of the
sound mark to supplement the description.187
As a result, sound marks have been registered with descriptions using ono-
matopoeia, listed musical notes and declaratory phrases. This method waives the
drawing requirement and, thus, has the advantage of relieving some of the difficul-
ties related to the visual representation of the mark, as in the case of non-musical
sound marks. However, the issue of clearly and accurately representing sound
marks through a written description still remains. In fact, some sound marks are
very detailed, like the famous Tarzan yell:188
The mark consists of the sound of the famous Tarzan yell. The mark is a
yell consisting of a series of approximately ten sounds, alternating between
the chest and falsetto registers of the voice, as follow — 1) a semi-long
sound in the chest register, 2) a short sound up an interval of one octave plus
a fifth from the preceding sound, 3) a short sound down a Major 3rd from
the preceding sound, 4) a short sound up a Major 3rd from the preceding
sound, 5) a long sound down one octave plus a Major 3rd from the preced-
ing sound, 6) a short sound up one octave from the preceding sound, 7) a
short sound up a Major 3rd from the preceding sound, 8) a short sound
down a Major 3rd from the preceding sound, 9) a short sound up a Major
3rd from the preceding sound, 10) a long sound down an octave plus a fifth
from the preceding sound.
While a detailed description could represent the sound more precisely, it
could, on the other hand, lack concision. Shorter descriptions are sometimes ambig-
uous. For example, “the [Pillsbury Giggle] mark consists of the sound of a childlike
183 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1105.
184 General Electric, supra note 98 at 562-563.
185 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examination Proce-
dure (2007) at s.1202.15, online: <http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/> [TMEP].
186 Kawasaki Motors Corp., supra note 161; McCormick, supra note 130, at 1106.
187 TMEP, supra note 185 at s. 807.09 and 1202.15 (“The reproduction should contain
only the mark itself; it is not meant to be a specimen. The specimen is used to show
that the sound mark actually identifies and distinguishes the goods/services and indi-
cates their source. The specimen should contain a sufficient portion of the audio or
video content to show how the mark is used on or in connection with the
goods/services”).
188 Reg. Number: 2210506.
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human giggle which represents the Pillsbury Doughboy giggle,”189 or the mark of
the AWS Convergence Technologies “consists of a series of five chirps similar to
the chirping sound of a cricket.”190 Therefore, in many cases, it is difficult to trans-
fer the written description into an aural impression and to determine the scope of
the mark.191
(ii) European Union’s Graphic Representation System
In the European Union, sound marks are registrable under certain conditions.
A sound mark must be represented graphically. This requirement of graphic repre-
sentation has been interpreted by the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) in a case of
olfactory marks. The E.C.J. states that the representation needs to be “clear, pre-
cise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective.”192 The
same criteria were applied in 2004 in the Shield Mark decision which dealt with
sound marks and their graphic representation.193 In addition, the E.C.J. states that a
trade-mark must not deprive the trade or the public of signs that should be free to
all.194
In relation to the requirement of graphic representation, the E.C.J. held that a
detailed musical notation on a stave divided into bars and showing clefs, musical
notes, rests, pitch and duration or a sonogram, with a timescale and a frequency
scale,195 in principle satisfies this requirement for sound marks196. With this quite
restrictive interpretation of graphic representations, the E.C.J. discredited the use of
some other possibilities. For instance, a mere written description such as “the first
nine notes of Für Elise” or “the sound of a cockcrow” would often lack clarity and
precision.197 Therefore, according to the E.C.J., it would be difficult to determine
the scope of the protection of the mark. However, not all written descriptions are
necessarily automatically precluded.198 The use of onomatopoeia199 is another ex-
189 Reg. Number: 2692077.
190 Reg. Number: 2827972.
191 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1111; Roth, supra note 99 at 486.
192 Sieckmann v. Deutches Patent und Markenamt, C-273/00, [2003] E.T.M.R. 37, ¶55.
193 Bretonnière & Rodari, supra note 50 at 52; Shield Mark, supra note 106.
194 Windsurfing Chiemsee v. Boots, [1999] E.T.M.R. 585 (E.C.J.); Vaver, “Unconven-
tional,” supra note 1 at 4.
195 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1110; Shield Mark, supra note 106; Metro Goldwyn-
Mayer Lion Corp’s Application No. 143891, R-781/1999-4, [2004] E.T.M.R. 34 [MGM
Application].
196 Shield Mark, supra note 106; Roth, supra note 99 at 483.
197 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1111; Shield Mark, supra note 106 (the opening bars of
Beethoven’s “Für Elise” and another set of a cockcrow crowing were the main trade-
marks that were at issue in the case).
198 Roth, supra note 99 at 483.
199 Onomatopoeia is defined as: “the creation and use of words which include sounds that
are similar to the noises that the words refer to.” “Pop”, “boom” and “squelch” are
examples of onomatopoeic words. Cambridge Dictionaries, s.v. “onomatopoeia,” on-
line: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/>
CANADA’S POSITION ON SOUND MARKS REGISTRATION   57
ample of a graphic representation discredited by the E.C.J. Indeed, the use of ono-
matopoeia does not meet the requirement because there could be a lack of consis-
tency between the onomatopoeia and the actual sound.200 Finally, a third approach
discredited by the E.C.J. is the use of musical notation in sequential order to re-
present the sound. For instance, “the first nine notes of Für Elise” could be de-
scribed as: E, D#, E, D#, E, B, D, C, A. According to the E.C.J., this kind of se-
quence of musical notes alone will ignore important information such as pitch and
duration of the melody201 and, thus, will not meet the requirement of graphic
representation.
While the European position presents some advantages in terms of clarifica-
tion and precision of the sound mark compared to the use of a written description,
some argue that it still poses some difficulties. Not everyone can read and under-
stand a detailed musical notation on a stave and even fewer, a sonogram.202 How-
ever, on this last point, the Board of Appeals in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Lion
Corp’s Application rejected the argument that a sonogram is unintelligible because
consumers cannot read it. It is true that some knowledge is needed to fully under-
stand a sonogram, however, according to the Board of Appeals, the same is true for
a musical notation and nobody seriously contests the fact that it is an adequate way
of representing sound marks graphically.203 In fact, a sonogram would, in princi-
ple, satisfy the graphic representation requirement because it indicates volume,
pitch and progression over time. Moreover, it could be argued that, in some cases,
using a sonogram may be a better way to described sounds than with musical nota-
tions since more sound characteristics may be depicted204
(iii) Australia’s Hybrid Representation System
In Australia, the application for registration must include both a graphical rep-
resentation and a clear and concise description of the trade-mark205 to ensure that it
is adequately represented.206 Eight separate recordings of the sound (e.g. compact
disc) are required to support an application.207 The applicant should also state that
the trade-mark is a sound trade-mark to be indexed in such a category.
200 McCormick, supra note 130 at 1111.
201 Playle & Hodson, supra note 107 at 332-333 (“The ECJ decision was based only on the
graphic representation in issue. Therefore, it did not rule on all kind of registration,
such as a sound recording annexed to the registration form or a digital recording acces-
sible through the Internet”).
202 McGinnis, supra note 76 at 135.
203 Roth, supra note 99 at 484; MGM Application, supra note 195.
204 Ibid.
205 IP Australia, Trade Marks Manuel Practice and Procedure-IP Australia [TMMPPA],
part 10 at 3.3.3; part 21 at 2, 6; s. 4.3(7) Subregulation, online:
<http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/resources/manuals_trademarks.shtml>.
206 Trade Marks Act 1995, s. 40 requires that all trade-marks be capable of being repre-
sented graphically.
207 Subregulation, supra note 205 at s. 4.3(8).
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An accurate trade-mark description is important as it facilitates searching the
database for any conflicting trade marks on the register.208 The relationship be-
tween the description and the graphical representation should be clearly noted in
order to avoid any confusion between them. For example, a cross reference to the
graphical representation can be included in the description.209 However, the
description and the graphical representation may sometimes be the same; the words
“represented graphically” have been broadly interpreted to include symbols in the
form of diagrams and writing.210 For example, a trade-mark has been registered
with the following description: “[t]he trade mark consists of the sound of the spo-
ken word BIMBO. The sound of the word is represented graphically by the follow-
ing: BIM BO as rendered on the cassette tapes forming part of the application.”211
On the other hand, a mark consisting of a musical sound will be, in general, repre-
sented graphically via musical stave. In such a case, the musical notation is consult-
able online.212
(c) Canadian Representation System Proposal
It is apparent, from the previous discussion, that each method of graphically
representing a sound mark, taken alone, offers advantages and inconveniences. Al-
though the use of written descriptions eliminates problems related to the visual rep-
resentation of sound marks that are not musical, there are issues with clarity and
accuracy. Alternatively, graphically representing a sound mark through musical no-
tation or a sonogram can ensure a more accurate and precise representation of the
sound. However, this method raises concerns regarding intelligibility, particularly
in the case of sonograms. CIPO could resolve these difficulties by requiring a com-
bination of these methods.
In the context of sound marks consisting of musical sounds, the representation
could be a musical notation on a stave joined with a concise written description of
the mark that provides information about the instrument used, the length of the
notes, or any other characteristics of the sound. To ensure clarity and precision, a
written description or a musical notation alone should not be accepted.213 Repre-
senting a sound mark consisting of non-musical sounds, such as an animal sound, is
more problematic. In order to meet the drawing requirement of section 30(h) of the
TMA, the representation could consist of a written description of the sound com-
bined with a sonogram of the sound. While some believe that sonograms may be
208 TMMPPA, supra note 205 Part 21(2).
209 Ibid.
210 TMMPPA, supra note 205 Part 21(5.1) (“As the words “represented graphically” have
not been judicially defined, it is appropriate to take as their meaning the common, ordi-
nary meaning they would be given by an ordinary person reading them — the so-called
“golden rule” of statutory interpretation. The Macquarie Dictionary gives graphical as
the equivalent of graphic, and defines “graphic” as follows: 2. pertaining to the use of
diagrams, graphs, mathematical curves, or the like; diagrammatic. 3. pertaining to writ-
ing: graphic symbols”).
211 Reg. Number: 850175.
212 See e.g. Reg. Number: 844282.
213 See possible area of convergence: SCT/19/2, supra note 51 at 10.
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useful in assessing the similarity between two sounds, there are a lot of questions
related to its being accessible to the general public, as few people are able to read
and understand a sonogram.214 Therefore, a possibility could be to create and ex-
ception to the drawing requirements in cases where sound marks consist of non-
musical sounds, like it has been done for color marks pursuant to section 28 of the
Canadian Trade-marks Regulations.215 For reasons discussed herein, one may won-
der, however, if a written description alone is enough to graphically represent a
sound mark. This kind of representation is well accepted in the United States, but
often lacks clarity and precision in Europe. Moreover, creating an exception for
non-musical sound marks could lead to ambiguous situations. For instance, should
a bird song or a cat meowing a song be considered as a musical or a non-musical
sound mark? The distinction between musical and non-musical sound marks can
sometimes be blurred.
Irrespective of the Canadian position on the matter, these combinations (writ-
ten descriptions/musical notations or written descriptions/ with or without so-
nograms) should be accompanied by a sample of the sound mark. Indeed, the best
way to truly understand a traditional trade-mark is obviously through visual means
such as a drawing. The same logic should be applied to sound marks. Even if an
applicant provides the most elaborate description of a sound mark, it cannot be
truly experienced unless it is heard through some other means. Therefore, Canada
should require that a sample of the sound mark be submitted with every sound
mark’s application.216 It is of interest to note that sample based systems are not
foreign to intellectual property law in Canada. In patent law, for instance, samples
can be deposited for biological materials following section 38.1 of the Patent Act
and sections 103 to 110 of the Patent Rules.217 A deposit may be made whether or
not it is necessary to enable the invention. However, it is a mandatory element
when biological materials cannot otherwise be adequately described to comply with
section 27(3) of the Patent Act.218
In terms of practical considerations, sound mark samples could be in the form
of an MP3 or WAV219 and should be available to the public through the Canadian
trade-marks database site by, for instance, providing an icon or hyperlink where the
sound can be heard. Written descriptions should refer to the sample for better co-
herence. Canada could also use the example of jurisdictions where registration sys-
214 Ibid. at 9 and 10.
215 Trade-marks Regulations, SOR/96-195 (TMR), s. 28(1) (“Where the applicant claims a
colour as a feature of the trade-mark, the colour shall be described”); McGinnis, supra
note 76 at 138.
216 McGinnis, supra note 76 at 140.
217 Patent Rules, SOR/96-423.
218 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice (MOPOP) (In-
dustry Canada, 1998) at 20 (“[. . .] a deposit may be made whether or not it is necessary
to enable the invention. Where the invention cannot be enabled [see 17.04] in the ab-
sence of access to a biological material, however, the deposit is a necessary element to
make the description sufficient unless the required material is publicly known and reli-
ably available to the person skilled in the art”).
219 SCT/19/2, supra note 51 at 10.
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tems allowing or requiring samples of sound marks already exist, such as New Zea-
land, Australia and United States.220 Finally, the term “sound mark” should be
clearly mentioned by applicants as a type of registered trade-mark. Therefore,
CIPO could create a separate section for sound marks and possibly subsections, for
example, for instrument music or animal noises, in order to facilitate a search of
database information.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the possibility of registering non-traditional marks, including
sound marks, has been growing internationally. In Canada, however, applications
to register sounds as trade-marks have been systematically refused by CIPO since
1989. CIPO’s position relies on a restrictive interpretation of the word “mark” that
imposed a visual requirement in the 1987 Federal Court of Canada’s Playboy deci-
sion. It has been argued in this article that this interpretation seems to be outdated
and should no longer be the standard for assessing the registrability of sound marks
in Canada. Indeed, with the globalization of markets and the increasing use of new
technologies and marketing methods, the current Canadian approach to the registra-
tion of sound marks is inconsistent with the evolution of business over the past
years. The favorable position of the United States, Europe and Australia in relation
to the registrability of sound marks reveals the changing realities of branding norms
and Canada should consider the position of these jurisdictions in order to ensure its
presence in a modern marketplace framework.
In order to register a sound mark, the emphasis should be on whether the
sound is distinctive enough to distinguish the wares and services of one source
from those of another. The nature of the mark should not preclude its registration.
In terms of degree of distinctiveness, a distinction between unique fanciful sounds,
which are more likely to be inherently distinctive, and commonplace ones should
be observed present. Commonplace sound marks may face particular challenges in
relation to the doctrine of functionality, even if this doctrine is not an absolute bar-
rier to their registration. In relation to the definition of “use,” particularly with re-
spect to wares, the requirement that “use” must be made at the time of transfer of
the property may raise some difficulties because the consumer may only listen to
the sound mark after the time of purchase, when he will have bought and used the
product. On this matter, a solution has been proposed relying on jurisprudence
dealing with the use of computer software marks that could be considered by CIPO.
In terms of policy issues related to cumulative protection, an overlap between
copyright and trade-mark protection does not appear to be a major obstacle to the
registration of sound marks. However, some concerns may be raised about the le-
gitimacy of a “partial” individual appropriation of a musical work that was previ-
ously part of the public domain. For some, works in the public domain are part of
our cultural heritage and should be completely free to everyone. For others, the
maintenance of trade-mark protection in some musical works can be reconciled
with the objectives underlying the temporally limited protection of copyright.
220 However, in Australia and United States, the scope of protection of the mark is deter-
mined by the written description; see also Appendix 2: Information Furnished by Ap-
plicants to Register Sound Marks in Different Jurisdictions, below.
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Finally, the graphic representation requirement is an important problematic is-
sue regarding the registration of sound mark. On this matter, combinations of dif-
ferent methods (written descriptions/musical notations or written descriptions with
or without sonograms) were proposed in order to clearly and accurately translate a
sound mark through a visual representation. More importantly, it was noted that
these combinations should be accompanied by a sample of the sound mark in the
form of an MP3 or WAV. A sample is necessary to truly understand what consti-
tutes the sound mark. Moreover, Canada should take advantage of new technolo-
gies by including in the Canadian trade-marks database digital versions (e.g. MP3
or WAV) of sound marks and make them accessible to the public and the legal
practitioners through the internet, as it could facilitate searching the database for
any conflicting trade marks on the register.
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Appendix 1: — Sound Marks Registrability by Jurisdiction
in 2006221
221 Data taken from: WIPO, Standing Committee on the law of trademarks, industrial
designs and geographical indications, Summary of replies to the questionnaire on
trademark law and practice, WIPO doc. SCT/11/6 (2006), at 25–27.
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** Sound marks are now registrable in Singapore. For more information see:
<http://www.ipos.gov.sg/topNav/hom/>.
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Appendix 2: — Information Furnished by Applicants to
Register Sound Marks in Different Jurisdictions222
Jurisdictions Information furnished to register sound marks
Australia — A graphical repsentation of the mark (musical nota-
tion or written description)
— Description of the mark
— Recording of the mark (audio tapes, compact discs
or other media which are easily accessible)
China (Hong Kong) — A graphical representation of the mark (detailed mu-
sical notation)
— A description of the mark
New Zealand — A graphical representation of the mark (where possi-
ble, include a musical score)
— A written description
— A sound file containing the sound in mp3 format
(not exceeding 1 MB and not allowing loops or
streaming)
— If the musical instrument used to produce the sound
forms part of the mark, this should be stated
Peru — A graphic representation of the mark
— A description of the mark
— Audiocassettes and compacts disk
Singapore — A representation of the mark (detailed musical nota-
tion)
— A description of the mark
— 2 copies of CD recording of the mark
Chinese Taipei — A representation of the mark (musical score, numer-
ical musical score or a written description; If the
musical score or numerical score is provided, a writ-
ten description shall also be enclosed)
— A CD recording of the sound
United States — A written description of the mark
— Audio cassettes and compact disks may be accepted
as specimens
222 Data taken from: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Intellectual
Property Experts Group and APEC Committee on Trade and Investment, Report for
APEC survey on non-traditional trade marks (2008), online: <http://www.apec.org/>.
